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1. Introduction 
In the past few decades, it became more and more common that governments used 
auctions to allocate scarce resources such as spectrum for mobile communication or 
radio broadcasting, petrol station locations, telephone numbers, etc.  Given the official 
goals of various allocation procedures, governments not always had a “lucky hand” in 
choosing the right auction design (see, e.g., Klemperer, 2002, for a review).  This paper 
adds to the list of unfortunate auction designs by analyzing the theoretical properties of 
an auction which properties were not yet known. 
The allocation mechanism we study has been used in practice at least twice.  The 
first time, it was used for allocating licenses for commercial radio stations in The 
Netherlands in 2003 (see Ministry of Education, Culture and Science, 2003, for the 
precise rules of the allocation mechanism used in The Netherlands).  In 2005, it was 
used in Ireland to allocate licenses for wideband digital mobile data services (the 
auction documents of the Commission for Communications Regulation, ComReg, are 
confidential; the media release of the outcome of the auction, reference number 
PR211205, can be found on the website of ComReg, http://www.comreg.ie). 
In the two auctions, multiple (possibly heterogeneous) licenses were allocated.  If 
licenses differed, they differed in terms of their coverage (i.e., the number of consumers 
reached) and as all bidders preferred a larger coverage, all bidders had the same ranking 
of licenses.  Each firm was allowed to acquire at most one license.  The auction format 
was sealed-bid, and firms could express different bids for different licenses.  The firms 
also had to submit a list specifying their respective preferences over the licenses at 
stake.  These preference lists played a role when a firm had submitted highest bids for 
several licenses.  Each winning firm paid its own bid for the license it acquired.  This 
allocation mechanism can be best described as a simultaneous pooled auction with 
multiple bids and preference lists. 
In this paper, we show that this auction format fails to produce one of the most 
basic and desirable properties of an allocation mechanism, namely that it has an 
efficient equilibrium.  In other words, the licenses do not always end up in the hands of 
those who value them the most.  The reason for this result is as follows.  Allocation 
efficiency requires that all bidders follow the same (symmetric) monotonically 
increasing (pure) bidding strategy.  This implies that if an efficient equilibrium exists, 
the bidder with the highest possible valuation must submit the highest bids for all 
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objects, and he takes the most preferred one.  However, this bidder can potentially 
increase his expected profit by changing his most preferred object and, at the same time, 
significantly reducing the bid for that object.  In this deviation, the bidder’s equilibrium 
(high) bid for his equilibrium (old) most preferred object remains the highest and, 
therefore, guarantees him his equilibrium pay-off.  The bidder will obtain his 
equilibrium pay-off if the reduced bid for the ‘new’ most preferred object is not the 
highest.  However, if the reduced bid turns out to be the highest bid, the bidder obtains 
his ‘new’ most preferred object for a very low price. 
There are some indications that the outcome of the Dutch allocation mechanism 
was inefficient.  A first indication is that not long after the auction was held, quite a few 
licenses were resold to third parties.  Had the licenses ended up in the hands of those 
parties that valued them the most, reselling (not long after the auction) should not have 
taken place.1  A second indication is that one of the licenses with a specific format 
requirement (these licenses were auctioned separately from the licenses for unrestricted 
programming at the same moment in time), was sold for a higher amount than the 
cheapest license for unrestricted programming (presumably, a more valuable license).2 
This paper relates to a number of areas in the economic literature.  First, it relates 
to the literature on simultaneous pooled auctions (see, e.g., Menezes and Monteiro, 
1998) in which, in contrast to the present paper, bidders are only allowed to submit a 
non-earmarked single bid for one of the objects in the pool.  As bidders are uncertain 
about which object from the pool of objects they are going to win and are only allowed 
to submit a single bid, bidders may fall pray to some sort of “winner’s curse”.  Salmon 
and Iachini (2007) experimentally show that bidders often overbid and incur losses 
because they are forced to buy objects that are not their most preferred objects.  In the 
mechanism analyzed in the present paper, bidders do not suffer from this unexpected 
loss because they are allowed to submit as many bids as objects.  Menezes and 
Monteiro (1998) show that in the homogeneous private-value case with risk-neutral 
bidders, simultaneous pooling auctions are revenue-equivalent to a first-price sealed-bid 
sequential auction. 
                                                                          
1  In particular, Noordzee FM (Talpa Radio International) was sold to De Persgroep on 31 May 2005, 
Radio 538 (Advent International Corporation) to Talpa Radio International on 31 May 2005, Yorin FM 
(RTL Nederland) to SBS Broadcasting on 4 January 2006 and Sky Radio (News Corporation) to TMG 
(Telegraaf Media Groep) on 1 February 2006.   
2  Of course, it is difficult to be sure that the auction was indeed inefficient because the presence of 
economic inefficiency is difficult to test statistically given the data available. 
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This paper also relates to the literature on the so-called ‘right-to-choose’ auctions.  
A right-to-choose auction, which is also referred to as a sequential pooled auction or 
“condo” auction (as it is being used in selling condominiums in the United States), 
consists of a sequence of regular auctions in which bidders bid for the right to choose 
any object among the objects not yet sold.  Burguet (2005) shows that ascending right-
to-choose auctions, i.e., right-to-choose auctions that consist of a sequence of regular 
English auctions, for two ex-ante symmetric objects are efficient.  Gale and Hausch 
(1994) derive the same conclusion for a two-bidder model with more general 
preferences than in Burguet (2005).  Goeree et al.  (2004) introduce bidders’ risk-
aversion into Burguet’s (2005) model.  They show that ascending right-to-choose 
auctions raise more revenue than standard simultaneous ascending auctions.  Eliaz et al. 
(2008) examine second-price sealed-bid right-to-choose auctions.  They show that in 
thin markets where there is little interest per object both theoretically and 
experimentally the second-price sealed-bid right-to-choose auction raises more revenue 
than sequential auctions for the individual objects.  They also provide experimental 
evidence that a right-to-choose auction can generate even more revenue than a 
theoretically optimal auction.  Moreover, in contrast to the optimal auction, the right-to-
choose auction is ‘approximately’ efficient in the sense that the surplus it generates is 
close to the maximal one. 
Finally, the paper is related to the literature on the efficiency properties of auctions.  
Moldovanu and Sela (2003) show that standard auction mechanisms may lead to 
inefficient allocations if values are strongly interdependent.  Janssen and Karamychev 
(2007) show that even if the externality (interdependence) is weak, efficient equilibria 
may fail to exist if the bidders’ types are strongly ex-ante correlated (affiliated).  The 
present paper, in contrast, shows that simultaneous pooling auctions with multiple bids 
and preference lists can be inefficient even in the independent private valuation setting.  
The paper can also be related to the literature on price dispersion.  In Subsection 3.2 we 
show that even if objects are perfect substitutes, firms bid for them differently. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows.  In Section 2, we set up the model, 
which contains the key features of the design of auctions held in The Netherlands and in 
Ireland.  In Section 3, we look at efficient Nash equilibria of the model and analyze their 
existence conditions.  In particular, Subsection 3.1 analyzes the model with 
heterogeneous objects, and Subsection 3.2 analyzes the model with homogeneous 
objects.  Section 4 concludes. 
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2. The model 
There are two objects3 for sale and N > 2 bidders.  Bidders are allowed to win at most 
one object.  Bidder i assigns a value iv  to object 1 and a value ivα  to object 2, where 
( ]1,0∈α  is common for all bidders.4  Valuations iv  are independently and identically 
distributed over the unit interval [0, 1] according to the distribution function F.  The 
value of iv  is private information to bidder i.  The values of α  and N, and the 
distribution function F are common knowledge. 
If 1<α , the goods are heterogeneous and the first object is preferred by all bidders 
to the second.  The ratio of valuations for the two objects is identical for all bidders.  
This seems to capture the essence of the Dutch radio frequency auction quite well where 
the value of a license is directly related to the demographic coverage of a license.  The 
licenses in the Dutch radio frequency auction differed in their demographic coverage.  If 
the coverage of the license increases and a firm attracts a certain percentage of the 
population, then the total number of listeners (hence, firm’s valuations for licenses) is 
proportional to that coverage.  If licenses are ex-ante identical in terms of their 
demographic coverage, they can be analyzed by the model with homogeneous objects, 
where 1=α .  In what follows, we do not consider asymmetric auctions where different 
bidders are characterized by different values of α  as in case of asymmetries, a general 
argument can be easily invoked to establish the inefficiency of the auction.5 
Every bidder i submits two bids, 1ib  and 
2
ib  in a sealed envelope, one for every 
object, and states his preference over the two objects in the event that both his bids turn 
out to be the highest.  The preference is expressed in terms of a probability distribution 
over the two objects and is represented by ip , the probability of taking object 1. 
The auctioneer collects all triples ( )iii pbb ,, 21  from all bidders and determines the 
highest bids for every object.  If these highest bids belong to different bidders, these 
                                                                          
3  The analysis for more than two objects is very similar and for simplicity in notation, we therefore 
concentrate on the two-object case. 
4  We assume linearity for simplicity; a common monotonically increasing scalar function would yield 
similar conclusions only adding to the notational complexity. 
5  If bidders are asymmetric, their types are drawn from different distributions or the ratios of their 
valuations for the two objects are different.  Efficient equilibria do not exist in either one of these cases as 
efficiency requires that bidding functions for different bidders must be identical (players with higher 
valuations must bid higher), while asymmetry requires different bidders to use different bidding functions 
(as the distribution of valuations of a bidder’s competitors has an impact on the bidder’s equilibrium 
bidding functions).   
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bidders win the objects for which they are the highest bidders, and they pay their 
winning bid as a price.  If, however, it is one and the same bidder j who has submitted 
the highest bids for both objects, then this bidder gets object 1 with probability jp  and 
object 2 with probability ( )jp−1 .  Bidder j pays his bid for the object that he gets.  The 
other object goes to the bidder who has submitted the second highest bid for that object.  
This bidder also pays his bid as a price. 
3. Analysis 
We will search for efficient Nash equilibria of this game, i.e., equilibria in which the 
two bidders with the two highest valuations win the objects, and, furthermore, in case 
1<α , the bidder with the highest value wins object 1 (the most valuable object) and the 
bidder with the second highest value wins object 2.  As equilibrium efficiency requires 
that bidders follow a symmetric monotonically increasing bidding strategy, we focus 
only on such equilibria.  We distinguish two cases. 
In Subsection 3.1, we assume that 1<α  so that the objects are heterogeneous.  In 
an efficient monotone symmetric equilibrium, if it exists, each bidder i with valuation 
iv  submits a bid ( )ii vbb 11 =  for object 1, a bid ( )ii vbb 22 =  for object 2, and sets his 
preferences for object 1, i.e.,  1=ip . 
In Subsection 3.2, we assume that the objects are homogeneous.  If bidders are not 
able to coordinate their bids 1ib  on one object and their bids 
2
ib  on the other object, a 
different type of equilibrium may emerge.  In a symmetric monotone bidding 
equilibrium, each bidder i places both his bids on both objects with equal probability, in 
the spirit of the strategic uncertainty assumption of Crawford and Haller (1990).  If an 
efficient equilibrium exists, each bidder i sets his preferences for the object on which he 
submits the lowest bid.  As all N bidders place their bids on both objects independently 
of each other, each of N2  possible distributions of N2  bids across two objects occurs 
with equal probability.  This equilibrium can alternatively be viewed as a symmetric 
mixed-strategy bidding equilibrium. 
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3.1. Heterogeneous objects 
We first show that for any 1<α  there is no efficient Nash equilibrium if the number of 
bidders N is sufficiently large.  The intuition is as follows.  In an efficient equilibrium, a 
bidder i with the highest possible valuation 1=iv  submits the highest bid on both 
objects with certainty and wins object 1, because the equilibrium efficiency requires that 
1=ip .  By significantly reducing his bid on object 2 and making this object his most 
preferred choice by submitting 0=ip , he can increase his expected pay-off (due to a 
higher surplus in the event he is still the highest bidder on object 2), which constitutes a 
profitable deviation.  As the realized profit from such a deviation is strictly positive and 
independent of the number of bidders N whereas the profit in the proposed efficient 
equilibrium asymptotically decreases to zero, a larger number of bidders N makes the 
deviation relatively more profitable. 
Proposition 1.  For any ( )1,0∈α , there exist a number ( )αNˆ  such that for all NN ˆ> , 
no pure strategy monotone symmetric equilibrium exists. 
Proof.  First of all, in any existing equilibrium the surplus of every type must converge 
to zero when ∞→N .  This can be seen as follows.  In a symmetric equilibrium, a 
bidder has the highest bid on both objects or on neither object.  If a bidder j has a 
valuation 1<jv , then the probability that he wins any of the objects converges to zero 
when ∞→N .  Consequently, the ex-ante expected surplus of bidder j also converges 
to zero with N.  If, however, 1=jv  then the winning probability is equal to 1 for any 
number of bidders, and bidder j’s expected surplus is equal to the surplus of his most 
preferred object revealed by ip , i.e.,  the largest of the two surpluses, 
11 jb−  or 2jb−α .  
If it were that 01 1 >>− εjb  for all N, then the bidder k with value 3/1 ε−=kv  (who is 
receiving asymptotically zero expected surplus in equilibrium as we explained above) 
would have got, by bidding 3/11 ε+= jk bb , a strictly positive surplus of 
( ) ( ) 03/3/3/1 11 >>+−−=− εεε jkk bbv .  If, on the other hand, it were that 
02 >>− εα jb  for all N, then the bidder k with value ( )αε 3/1−=kv  would have got, by 
bidding ε3122 += jk bb , a strictly positive surplus of 
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( )( ) ( ) 03/3/3/1 22 >>+−−=− εεαεαα jkk bbv .  In both cases, there is a bidder k who 
can profitably deviate.  Hence, for any 0>ε , ε<− 11 jb  and εα <− 2jb  if N is taken to 
be large enough. 
Next, let us consider a bidder j with valuation 1=jv , who in an efficient 
equilibrium submits the highest bid on both objects and surely wins his most preferred 
object, i.e., object 1 (as efficiency requires 1=ip ).  His surplus from this object 
converges to zero when ∞→N  (as shown above).  Hence, there exists a number ( )αNˆ  
such that ( ) 2/1 1 α<− jb  for all ( )αNN ˆ> .  Bidder j can profitably deviate by bidding 
2/αγ <  for object 2, and submitting 0=ip  though.  He is then still the bidder with the 
highest bid on object 1, which assures him his equilibrium profit.  In addition, with a 
small probability, he has the highest bid on object 2 as well.  In that case he wins object 
2 at price γ.  For all ( )αNN ˆ>  this deviation is profitable because 
( )112/ jb−>>− αγα . ■ 
In accordance with Proposition 1, if the number of bidders is sufficiently large, only 
inefficient equilibria may exist.  This inefficiency result might not really be a problem 
because the game might still be efficient for small N.  The following proposition, 
however, shows that the non-existence of efficient equilibria may even appear for 
3=N  if the objects are sufficiently equal in value.  
Proposition 2.  For any 3≥N , there exists a number ( ) ( )1,0ˆ ∈Nα  such that for all 
( )( )1,ˆ Nαα ∈ , no pure strategy monotone symmetric equilibrium exists, so that all Nash 
equilibria of this game are inefficient. 
Proof.  Assume that a pure strategy monotone symmetric equilibrium exists, and let 
( )vNs ,,α  denote the equilibrium surplus of the bidder of type v.  Obviously, 
( ) vvNs <,,α  for all values of ( ]1,0∈v , and uniformly for all values of ( )1,0∈α .  Let 
us consider a bidder i of type 1=iv .  The deviation by bidding γ=2ib  for object 2 and 
submitting 0=ip  is profitable if ( )1,, Ns αγα >− .  Hence, as long as ( )1,, Ns αα > , 
there exists a sufficiently small γ  so that the deviation is indeed profitable, and the 
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game has no pure strategy monotone symmetric equilibrium.  Taking 
( ) ( ) 11,,supˆ <= NsN αα
α
 completes the proof. ■ 
The conditions in Proposition 1 and Proposition 2 can be made more precise if we make 
an extra assumption about the distribution function F.  Proposition 3 below shows that 
when valuations are uniformly distributed, the game does not have efficient equilibria 
even if the objects are quite different, i.e., even if α  is relatively small (but larger than 
( )1/1 −N ). 
Proposition 3.  Let 3≥N  and the valuations be uniformly distributed over [ ]1,0 .  If 
( )1/1 −> Nα  then the game has no efficient Nash equilibria. 
Proof.  First, the efficiency criterion requires that every bidder puts his preference on 
object 1.  Second, using a standard technique from auction theory we assume that all 
bidders ij ≠  follow a symmetric bidding strategy and bid ( ) ( ) ( )( )1,,,, 2121 jjjjj vbvbpbb = .  
If bidder i bids ( ) ( ) ( )( )1,,,, 221121 xbxbpbb iii = , where ( )vb1  and ( )vb2  are assumed to be 
strictly increasing and continuously differentiable bidding functions, he gets the 
following expected pay-off: 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )( )1111222111 Pr1NOTPrPr iiiiiiiiiiiii bbbbbbbvbbbv −−−− >−>>−+>−= απ . 
Let us consider the following two cases in which we denote the first and the second 
order statistics of ( )1−N  competitors’ valuations iv−  by y and z respectively: 
a) If 21 xx ≥  then ( ) ( ) ( ) 11111 PrPr −− =>=> Nii xyxbb  and 
( )( ) ( )( ) ( )
( )( )( ) ,11
PrPr1NOTPr
221
21111122
−
−−−
−−=
>≥>=>−>>
N
iiiiii
xxN
zxxybbbbbb
 
so that 
( )( ) ( )( )( )( ) 2212111 11 −− −−−+−= NiiNiii xxNbvxbv απ . 
b) If 21 xx ≤  then, again, ( ) ( ) ( ) 11111 PrPr −− =≥=> Nii xyxbb  and 
( )( ) ( )( ) ( )
( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )( )( ) ,11
PrPr
,PrPr1NOTPr
2221112
212
21111122
−−−
−−−
−−+−=
>>+>>=
>>=>−>>
NNN
iiiiii
xxNxx
zxyxyx
zxxybbbbbb
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so that 
( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )( )( )22211122111 11 −−−− −−+−−+−= NNNiiNiii xxNxxbvxbv απ . 
Combining both cases, we can rewrite iπ  as follows: 
( ) ( )( )( ) ( )( )( )( )( )
( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )( )( ) ( ),1 11,, 122212111222
22122111121
1 xxxxxNxxxbv
xxNxbvxxbvxxv
NNN
i
N
i
N
iii
−−−−−−+
+−−−+−=
−−−
−−
α
απ
 
where 
( ) ⎩⎨
⎧
≥
<≡
0 if ,1
0 if ,01
x
x
x . 
Bidder i maximizes iπ  with respect to 1x  and 2x , and the maximum must be attained at 
( )vxxvi === 21 , which is the truth-telling condition for the mechanism.  The first-
order conditions are: 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )⎪⎪⎩
⎪⎪⎨
⎧
−⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ −−−−−=∂
∂=
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ −−+−−−−=∂
∂=
−
−
32
2
2
221
1
1
121,,0
11,,0
Ni
Ni
vvvbvNv
dv
dbvNvvv
x
vvbvNvbvNv
dv
dbvvvv
x
απ
απ
. 
Solving this system of differential equations yields the following unique candidate 
bidding functions: 
( ) ( )
( )⎪⎪⎩
⎪⎪⎨
⎧
−
−=
+−=
v
N
Nvb
v
N
Nvb
α
α
1
2
1
2
1
. 
Thus, if an efficient Nash equilibrium exists, it must be given by the above bidding 
functions.  Let us consider a bidder j with valuation 1=jv .  His equilibrium pay-off is 
( ) ( ) Nj /11,1,1 απ += . 
Deviating by bidding ( ) ( ) ( )1/222 −−== NNbbj αεε , where ε is arbitrarily small, 
bidder j has still the highest bid on object 1, but with a small probability he is also the 
highest bidder for object 2.  Stating his preference as 0=jp  yields him in such rare 
occasions a pay-off of εα − .  Thus, the pay-off jπ~  of bidder j from such a deviation is: 
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( ) ( ) ( )( )
( ) ( ) ( )( )( ) ( ) ( )( )( )
( )( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )( )
( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )
( ) ( )
( ) ( ) .
1
211
111
1
2
Pr1Pr
Pr1Pr
Pr1NOTPr
Pr~
1
11
12
221222
2222111
222
−
−−
−−
−−
−−−
−
⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛
−
−−+−++=
−⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ +−−+⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛
−
−−=
<−−+<−=
>−−+>−=
>−>>−+
+>−≡
N
NN
jjjjj
jjjjj
jjjjjj
jjjj
N
N
NN
N
N
N
N
vbvvbv
vbbbvvbbbv
vbbvbbbbbv
vbbbv
εαεααα
εαεαεα
εεεα
εεεα
εε
εαπ
 
This implies that if ( ) N/1 αα +> , there exists an ε: 
( ) ( ) ( )( )
( ) α
ααααε
NN
NN
N
N
N 2
111
1
2/1 −
−−−=⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛
−
−⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ +−<  
such that ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )1,1,1/1,,~ 21 jjjj Nbvbv παεπ =+>  so that the deviation is profitable.  
Hence, an efficient equilibrium does not exist for ( )1/1 −> Nα . ■ 
In summary, Proposition 3 shows that the non-existence of efficient Nash equilibria is 
not only an asymptotic property of the game, as established in Proposition 1 and 
Proposition 2.  Efficient equilibria may fail to exist also for small N, as long as the 
objects are sufficiently equal in value.  For the uniform distribution, efficient Bayes-
Nash equilibria fail to exist for any 3≥N  provided 5.0>α .  On the other hand, 
efficient equilibria may also fail to exist even for small values of α , i.e., when objects 
are very different in terms of valuations, as long as the number of bidders is large.  For 
the uniform distribution, efficient Bayes-Nash equilibria fail to exist for any 0>α  
provided α/11+>N . 
3.2. Homogeneous objects 
In Section 3.1, Proposition 1, we have given a reason why efficient equilibria may not 
exist in case objects are heterogeneous.  In short, when all bidders submit their high bids 
( )ivb1  for object 1 and their low bids ( )ivb2  for object 2, some bidders, in particular a 
bidder i with the highest possible valuation 1=iv , unilaterally have an incentive to 
switch their preference from object 1 to object 2, i.e., to put 0=ip  and to reduce their 
bid for object 2.  This deviation breaks an efficient equilibrium which requires 1=ip . 
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However, when objects are homogeneous, i.e., when 1=α , the efficiency criterion 
does not require that 1=ip  anymore.  This may lead to another type of equilibrium, 
where bidders do not coordinate on bidding ( )ivb1  for object 1 and ( )ivb2  for object 2.  
Bidders simply submit two bids for two objects, and they do not pay any attention 
whether the bid ( )ivb1  is placed on object 1 and the bid ( )ivb2  is placed on object 2, or 
the other way around.  From the point of view of one bidder, any other bidder puts 
( )ivb1  and ( )ivb2  on object 1 with equal probability.6  In other words, bidders put their 
(deterministic) bids randomly on both objects.  In order to get the highest possible 
expected surplus, every bidder will set his preferences for the object on which he 
submits the lowest bid. 
In the following proposition, we show that in case objects are homogeneous no 
efficient Nash equilibria exist. 
Proposition 4.  The auction with homogeneous objects has no efficient symmetric Nash 
equilibria. 
Proof.  Suppose an efficient Nash equilibrium does exist, and let its monotone and 
symmetric bidding functions be ( )vb1  and ( )vb2 .  Then, it cannot be that ( ) ( )11 21 bb =  
due to the following reason.  If a bidder j with the highest possible valuation 1=jv  bids 
the same amounts for both objects, he is the highest bidder for both of them, and he gets 
the pay-off ( )11 2b− .  By deviating and reducing his second bid ( )122 bbj <  he gets a 
higher pay-off ( )111 22 bbj −>−  with a strictly positive probability.  Thus, the bidding 
functions must not coincide so that there must be an open interval of valuations 
( )vv,=Θ  on which ( ) ( )vbvb 21 > . 
However, if ( ) ( )vbvb 21 >  for all ( )vvv ,∈ , then there is a positive probability that 
all bidders’ valuations will be drawn from Θ  in such a way that 
a) vvvvvvv Ni >>>>>>>> KK321  and ( ) ( )1231 vbvb > ; and 
                                                                          
6  The superscripts of the bidding functions ( )ivb1  and ( )ivb2  do not anymore refer to the objects and are 
only used to make a distinction between the bids. 
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b) ( )11 vb , ( )21 vb , and ( )32 vb  are placed on object 1, and ( )12 vb , ( )22 vb , and ( )31 vb  
are placed on object 2. 
In such a case, bidder 1 takes object 1 (as ( )11 vb  is the highest overall bid and bidder 1’s 
low bid on object 2 does not turn out to be the highest bid on object 2) and bidder 3 
takes object 2 (as ( ) ( )2231 vbvb > ).  Hence, the game has no efficient Nash equilibria. ■ 
It turns out that the analytical derivation of the equilibrium bidding functions is very 
complicated due to the random (binomial) distributions of bidders’ high and low bids 
over the two objects.  This randomness also complicates a numerical analysis for a 
general number of bidders.  For the simplest case where 3=N  and valuations being 
uniformly distributed over the [ ]1,0  interval, we numerically obtain equilibrium bidding 
functions.  Figure 1 presents the bidding functions themselves whereas Figure 2 
presents their derivatives.  The horizontal axis in both pictures denotes valuations, and 
the vertical axes denote the bidding functions, Figure 1, and their derivatives, Figure 2. 
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Figure 1.  Equilibrium bidding functions ( )vb1  and ( )vb2  for 3=N , 1=α  and 
uniform distributions of bidders’ valuations. 
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Bidding behavior of a bidder with a value close to zero can be described as follows.  
The probability that he outbids two competitors is negligibly small compared to 
outbidding only one.  Therefore, his bidding strategy is based on out-competing only 
one bidder.  Consequently the auction game for a low-valuation bidder is like a single-
object first-price sealed-bid auction with one competitor, where bidding half of his 
value is an equilibrium strategy. 
Observe that ( )ivb1  contains a kink at 633.0≈v .  The reason that there is a kink in 
( )ivb1  is the following.  Let us have a look at a bidder with v = 0.80.  His high bid is 
always higher than the low bid of the highest value bidder (v = 1).  For a bidder with for 
example v = 0.40 this is not the case.  The kink is exactly at the level v for which 
( ) ( )121 bvb = .  This kink of ( )ivb1  causes a kink in the derivative of ( )ivb2  and, 
therefore, it causes a discontinuity in its second-order derivative.  This discontinuity, in 
turn, causes a kink in the derivative of ( )ivb1 , and, therefore, it causes a kink in the 
second derivative of ( )ivb2 .  This latter kink, in turn, causes a discontinuity in the third-
order derivative of ( )ivb2 , and so on, ad infinitum.  It makes numerical calculations of 
the bidding functions unstable and complex. 
Further numerical calculations with the same parameters show that with probability 
of about 4.3% the outcome of the auction is not efficient, i.e., the second highest 
valuation bidder does not get the second object.7  This 4.3% is a lower bound (when 
valuations are uniformly distributed over the [ ]1,0  interval): if the number of bidders 
                                                                          
7  The highest value bidder always wins an object in a monotone symmetric bidding equilibrium. 
0.00
0.10
0.20
0.30
0.40
0.50
0.60
0.00 0.10 0.20 0.30 0.40 0.50 0.60 0.70 0.80 0.90 1.00
 
Figure 2.  Derivatives of equilibrium bidding functions. 
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increases, then this probability increases too.  The intuition is twofold.  First, if more 
than three bidders compete, then more than one bidder can outbid the second highest 
valuation bidder on one of the objects, and, second, the expected difference between the 
low bid of the second highest valuation bidder and the high bid of the lower valuation 
bidders is smaller.  On the other hand, the expected efficiency loss goes down when the 
number of bidders increases. 
4. Concluding remarks 
This paper shows that simultaneous pooled auctions with multiple bids and preference 
lists, where single-object demand bidders are allowed to make separate bids for each 
object and submit a preference list to rank these objects, never have efficient equilibria 
unless objects are sufficiently heterogeneous.  In so far, as efficiency of auctions’ 
outcome is an important consideration for governments – and which government would 
ever want to openly deny that this is the case? – the paper shows that this type of 
auction format, i.e., a multi-object sealed-bid auction with right-to-choose ingredients, 
should not be used (anymore).  Other mechanisms exist that exhibit these efficiency 
properties (under fairly general conditions), like the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves 
mechanism,8 the simultaneous ascending auction,9 and the right-to-choose auction.  In 
laboratory experiments, Goeree et al. (2006) show that with respect to efficiency, the 
simultaneous ascending auction performs better than auctions with a first-price element 
like the simultaneous first-price auction, the sequential first-price auction and the 
simultaneous descending auction.  As other auction formats perform better, we do not 
see good economic arguments why the auctions analyzed in this paper should be used in 
future allocation processes. 
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